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Résumé : Cet article dresse un rapide panorama de l’approche usuelle de
la quantification, qu’elle soit ou non généralisée, en linguistique formelle et en
philosophie du langage. Nous montrons que le cadre général courant va parfois
à l’encontre des données linguistiques, et nous donnons quelques indications
pour une approche différente basée sur la théorie de la démonstration qui, sur
bien des points, s’avère plus proche de la langue que les approches les plus
répandues. Nous soulignons l’importance des opérateurs tau et epsilon de
Hilbert qui rendent compte respectivement de la quantification universelle et
existentielle. En effet, ces opérateurs permettent de construire des représenta-
tions sémantiques en suivant la structure de la langue avec, en particulier, des
groupes nominaux quantifiés qui soient des termes individuels. Nous donnons
aussi des principes pour définir des règles de déduction qui correspondent aux
quantificateurs généralisés.
Abstract: This paper gives an overview of the common approach to quan-
tification and generalised quantification in formal linguistics and philosophy
of language. We point out how this usual general framework represents a
departure from empirical linguistic data. We briefly sketch a different idea for
proof theory which is closer to the language itself than standard approaches in
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many aspects. We stress the importance of Hilbert’s operators—the epsilon-
operator for existential and tau-operator for universal quantifications. Indeed,
these operators are helpful in the construction of a semantic representation
which is close to natural language in particular with quantified noun phrases
as individual terms. We also define guidelines for the design of proof rules
corresponding to generalized quantifiers.
1 Foreword: empirical data on
quantification
Despite the extensive study of quantification from many different viewpoints
in logic, linguistics and philosophy, we think that the dominant model the-
oretic approach partially excludes some relevant facts that commonly occur
in linguistics [Gabbay, Shehtman et al. 2009], [Peters & Westerståhl 2006],
[Steedman 2012], [Szabolcsi 2010].
1.1 Quantification in ordinary language: common
and complex
Quantifiers are quite common in ordinary language:
(1) Something happened to me yesterday.1
(2) A man walked into a bar.
(3) There are infinitely many primes.
(4) Every natural number can be represented as the sum of four integer
squares.
(5) That way we’re all writing now.
(6) a. All children are artists.
b. The children didn’t miss a swimming pool, they were body boarding
nearly all day.
(7) There are several reasons why few students read newspapers in the
present.
(8) Two thirds of the world’s inhabitants are clustered in these four regions.
1. All examples were found on the web: news, song lyrics, blogs, etc. Otherwise,
i.e., to exemplify something that would not be said, we appended the superscript (us)
at the end of the example.
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(9) For the first time, a majority of Californians age 55 and older think that
marijuana should be made legal (52% legal, 45% not legal).
(10) Many students may find it helpful to be doing practical work that
contributes to what they are studying.
(11) It’s fair to say that most Stones fans love Jigsaw.
(12) Most students are bored by history courses as they are usually taught.
(13) The Brits love France.
(14) MPs rejected amendments to the Consumer Rights Bill yesterday
(12 January) that would have made secondary ticketing websites more
transparent.
Nevertheless, their linguistic and logical study is quite complex for at least
two reasons. Firstly, as we shall see, besides the well-known quantifiers used
in mathematics for all ∀ (examples 6, 5, 4) and there exists ∃ (ex. 3, 2, 1),
natural language makes use of a variety of quantifiers like “two thirds” (ex. 8),
“few” (ex. 7), “a majority of” (ex. 9), “most” (ex. 12,11), “many” (ex. 10).
Secondly, the wording of these quantifiers is often ambiguous and sometimes
implicit. For instance, plural noun phrases both definite and indefinite plural
articles (which have an empty realisation in English) can be used to mean “all”
or “most” as can be observed in examples 13 and 14.2
We will now give a brief description of some (linguistically oriented)
features concerning the two “mathematical” quantifiers for all and there exists.
1.2 Existential quantification in natural language
The existential quantifier is omnipresent in natural language. As soon as one
speaks about something or someone, this new discourse referent is existentially
quantified and can be referred to by pronouns or definite noun phrases in
anaphoric chains.
(15) A man walked into a bar. His work boots were muddy, and he had dirt
caked under his fingernails. He wore a grimy hoodie, and kept an arm
at his waist, [...]
This sort of existential quantification is an important part of the structure
of a discourse. Observe that the scope of the existential quantifier extends
from one sentence (proposition) to the next one—this is one of the reasons why
dynamic logics have been introduced. The behaviour of existential quantifiers
actually leads to a formalism structured on existential quantification, namely
2. When meaning “all” or “most”, bare plurals and definite noun phrases are
possible depending on the context. The presence of “the” is probably related to
the existence of possible alternatives, but this observation deserves further linguistic
discussion (thanks to Gilles Zémor for helpful discussions and English expertise).
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Discourse Representation Theory, in which logical formulas are built in order
to better fit the linear progression of sentences. DRT has often been contrasted
to compositional semantics, since DRT proceeds in a top-down direction, from
large units (complex phrases) to the smallest ones (i.e., words), but by now,
there exist compositional formulations of DRT. In short, existential quantifiers
form a fundamental part of discourses and conversations, contributing to their
structure and coherence [Kamp & Reyle 1993].
1.3 Universal quantification over potentially infinite
sets in natural language
The universal quantifier, while widely used in mathematics, is rather rare in
ordinary conversation, as suggested by the corpus study above. An exception
is provided by quantifiers which refer to a group that can be understood from
the context, as in example 5. The negative formulation by the use of no one,
nothing, etc. is more frequent, thus no one came means that every one did
not come.
In speaking about natural language it is customary to assume that quan-
tification refers to a finite number of entities.3 This is not always the case.
We certainly meet such expressions in mathematical discussions, but also in a
variety of other cases:
(16) He wrapped up by explaining the dark future for the Universe when all
the stars go away.
(17) All atoms are made from the same bits, which are called subatomic
particles.
(18) Just about all sentences in the English language fall into ten patterns
determined by the presence and functions of nouns, verbs, adjectives,
and adverbs.
(19) All ideas are welcome.
1.4 Vague quantifiers in natural language
In 1.1 we stressed that most provides a form of quantification. This is quite
common and it also applies to infinite collections of objects:
(20) In basic math, we’re taught multiplication tables. We learn that most
numbers are the answer to at least two different multiplication problems,
some numbers are the answer to several, and then...
3. It may be even more complicated, since a quantifier may refer to entities that
are uncountable and continuous like the mass noun wine in Peter drank up all the
wine last night.
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(21) Any module of known β is weak. Most numbers have even β and most
of them are not antisymmetric.
(22) The number one reason why most people fail at dieting is simple: they
can’t stick to it.
(23) Since most numbers are not prime, it would waste time to check every
number.
(24) ... thus, in the limit most numbers are not prime.
1.5 Human processing of quantification
Humans have difficulties in processing quantifiers, in particular when they
occur in a phrase with an alternation of quantifiers. There are experiments in
support of this viewpoint, see [Szymanik & Zajenkowski 2010]. On the other
hand it is possible, even if quite rare, to find Henkin quantifiers4 in natural
language, as in Every member of the lab knows a member of every village
sports club. What do people mean when using such quantifiers that would
require a lifetime verification? The question remains unanswered. We know
that our study, as well as others, via a confrontation of the formal model
with what we hear or with psycholinguistic experiments may give some hints
regarding the complexity of the human processing.
These few introductory words should have convinced the reader that
quantification is an important and common phenomenon in natural language.
Although many aspects of quantification still deserve a proper mathematical
study (generalised quantifiers like “two thirds”, vague quantifiers like “a large
part of”, higher order quantifiers like in “he believes whatever he is being
told”, or quantification with generic elements like Hilbert’s tau and epsilon)
one cannot say that there is intensive mathematical research on quantification.
So we agree with semanticists: quantification is an important issue which
connects logic, linguistics and philosophy.
2 Remarks on the two mathematical
quantifiers, there exists and for all
The two quantifiers that belong to mathematics, namely ∀ and ∃, have
a proper logical description, both syntactical, with rules (since Aristotle),
and semantical, with interpretations in models (since the beginning of the
20th century).
4. They are also known as branching quantifiers and they produce, if applied to a
formula, its second order Skolemisation [Henkin 1961].
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2.1 First order logic and completeness
An important result in first order logic is the completeness theorem, established
by Gödel in 1930. The theorem shows the equivalences of two notions. It states
that a formula is true in every model (1) if and only if it is provable (2)—the
direction from (2) to (1) is known as the soundness theorem and it is easier
to prove. The usual proof is by induction on the derivation. Other famous
theorems are the compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem theorems. The former
says that if every finite subset of a set F of formulae is contradiction free
(admits a model), so is F , and the latter says that a theory with an infinite
model and a countable language has models of every infinite cardinality [Kneale
& Kneale 1986].
Those results are well known—especially completeness—and, by now, the
proof theoretical study of quantification is not much developed. One should be
aware that the correspondence established by the completeness theorem works
only for first-order classical logic—and not for higher order logic. For instance,
when second or higher order quantification is used, sub-Boolean algebras have
to be considered. Moreover, when other logics are considered, more articulated
structures are required to maintain that correspondence. Even in the well-
studied case of intuitionistic logic, more complicated models are needed, e.g.,
(pre)sheaves of L-structures or Kripke models [Gabbay, Shehtman et al. 2009].
2.2 Some subtle differences: each/ every
Even if we only consider first order quantification, the correspondence between
provability and truth is not as transparent as one hopes. Natural language
provides good insights into the distinction between the proof theoretical and
the model theoretical approach.
More formally, completeness expresses the equivalence between
• provability ` ∀x. P (x) inferred from a proof without a free hypothesis
involving a free x (a proof with a generic x; the precise rule is given
thereafter);
• model theoretic truth, that is, in each model Mi with domain Di, P (x)
holds for any x ∈ Di, i.e., the conjunction &x∈DiP (x) holds.
An important remark is that the proof theoretical viewpoint is finite, while
the model theoretic view involves two sets, which may be infinite: domains
may be infinite.5
5. In first order logic, one can build a theory with models having a cardinality
less than a given natural number n by adding to the theory the first order formula
∀x0 · · · ∀xn∀xn(xn = x0 ∨ xn = x1 · · · ∨ xn = xn−1). However, there is no way to
build a theory with finite models. Indeed, this would require second order logic, and
to use Dedekind finiteness: every functional binary predicate which is injective, is also
surjective—for a given binary predicate, being a function, being surjective and being
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The proof theoretic approach uses a generic element. To prove something
that holds for all numbers, the proof starts with Let n be a number. . . , which
means that n has no other property than being a number—this method goes
back at least to Pythagoras (580–490 BC) long before the advent of logical
formalisation.
It should be observed that natural language makes a similar distinction
between the two notions of quantification above: it seems that each and
all rather concern the complete enumeration of the elements in a collection
while every, any or bare plurals (e.g., Ducks lay eggs) rather concern generic
elements, laws and universal rules. The authors of this paper have conducted
a specific study of this difference in French, comparing chaque (∼ each?) with
tous les (∼ all ?) involving psycholinguistic experiments to support such claims
[Capelier-Mourguy, Blache et al. 2015].
2.3 Domain restriction
Quantification in natural language is commonly formulated with a restriction
to a given class, as “stars” in the following example:
(25) All the stars go away.
and this is also common in mathematics, despite the fact that in the standard
set theoretic framework everything is a set:
∀x ∈ N, ∃u1 ∈ N,∃u2 ∈ N, ∃u3 ∈ N, ∃u4 ∈ N, x = (u1)2 +(u2)2 +(u3)2 +(u4)2.
The previous restrictions are related to a well-identified class of (inanimate)
things or human beings, but there are quantifiers that are not restricted to
specific classes, like everything and something, and these apply to a single
property.
(26) Everything has changed.
(27) Something happened to me yesterday.
Using another wording for quantifiers like all, every, some, etc., it is necessary
to specify the class of entities (example 25) which the quantifier applies to,
whereas it is not necessary for quantifiers like everything or everyone—while
this later quantifier implicitly includes a restriction class, namely the class of
human beings.
The restriction to a given class disappeared from mathematical logic
(but not from type theory) because of the work of Frege, who insisted, for
philosophical reasons, in having a single one-sorted universe. Thus, using an
implicit correspondence between a set M and a predicate M(x), one is able to
represent quantification with restriction to a given class:
injective are easily formulated in first order logic, but then one needs to quantify over
binary predicates, see, e.g., [van Dalen 2013, chap. 5], and the family of all models
may be infinite as well.
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∀x ∈M P (x) ≡ ∀x (M(x)⇒ P (x))
∃x ∈M P (x) ≡ ∃x (M(x)&P (x)).
2.4 Natural language examples of the formulation of
quantification
To present examples from the most studied quantifiers, we follow Aristotle’s
Square of oppositions:
• A: All As are Bs.
• I: Some As are Bs.
• E: No As are Bs.
• O: Not all As are Bs.
(modern formulation, with a different focus: some As are not Bs)
In the original formulation, the expression A and B denoted terms, which are
much vaguer than properties or predicates—in the Middle Ages, the theory
of suppositiones already contributed to the clarification of the notion of term
neater.
2.4.1 Existential affirmatives
Existential quantification (Some As are Bs) is formulated with some, there
is, a it can also be formulated without an explicit restriction to a class of
individuals by the words someone, or something. The last two sentences 30a
and 30c show that natural language is finer grained: indeed natural language
makes a distinction between two statements with equivalent logical forms (resp.
30b and 30d): the difference lies in the focus of the sentence, which accounts
for the absence of t sentences like 30c from corpora, because people are not
interested in crooks as a class.
(28) There’s a tramp sittin’ on my doorstep.
(29) Some girls give me money.
(30) Something happened to me yesterday.
a. Some politicians are crooks.
b. ∃x. politician(x)&crook(x).
c. Some crooks are politicians.
d. ∃x. crook(x)&politician(x).
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2.4.2 Existential negatives
Observe that the negative existential (the fourth corner of Aristotle’s
Square of oppositions) is NOT lexicalised (in English and other languages).
Psycholinguists know that this is harder to grasp and rather ambiguous.
Moreover, in ordinary conversation, an negative existential statement is often
misunderstood as a universal negative statement (e.g., example 31 may be
understood as 32). For a psycholinguistic study of the human understanding
of such sentences, see e.g., [Delfitto & Vender 2010] where more references can
be found. Also observe that in our unambiguous rephrasing 35 of 34, the focus
has changed from the individuals who can be funded to those who cannot,
making the rephrased statement more difficult to understand.
(31) Not every picture tells a story.
(32) No picture tells a story(us).
(33) Some students do not participate in group experiments or projects.
(34) Everyone is entitled to an opinion, but not every opinion is entitled to
student government funding.
(35) Everyone is entitled to an opinion, but some opinions are not entitled
to student government funding.(us)
2.4.3 Universal affirmatives, especially on infinite domains
We have already provided some examples of universal statements. Here are
some more, ranging on a potentially infinite domain:
(36) Each star in the sky is an enormous glowing ball of gas.
(37) All groups of stars are held together by gravitational forces.
(38) Terence Tao, a Fields medalist, has published a paper that proves that
every odd number greater than 1 is the sum of at most five primes.
2.4.4 Universal negatives, especially on infinite domains
The universal negative statements are expressed either by no or, without a
restriction to a class, by no one, nothing. Here are some examples:
(39) Because no planet’s orbit is perfectly circular, the distance of each varies
over the course of its year.
(40) Nothing’s gonna change my world.
(41) Porterfield went where no colleague had gone previously this season,
realising three figures.
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2.5 Proof theory of mathematical quantifiers
∃ and ∀
How do ∃ and ∀ work from a proof theoretical viewpoint? They both have
introduction and elimination rules:
• Universal quantifier
– The ∀ introduction rule says, as above, that when a property has
been established for an x which does not enjoy any particular
property (i.e., is not free in any hypothesis), one can conclude
that the property holds for all individuals:
no free occurrence of x
in any term of any Hi
H1, . . . , Hn ` P (x)
∀i
H1, . . . , Hn ` ∀x. P (x)
– The ∀ elimination rule says that when a property has been es-
tablished for all individuals it can be inferred for any particular
individual (or term):6
H1, . . . , Hn ` ∀x. P (x)
∀e
H1, . . . , Hn ` P (a)
• Existential quantifier
– The ∃ introduction rule says that whenever a property P holds
for an individual (or a term) a one can infer that there exists an
individual enjoying P
H1, . . . , Hn ` P (a)
∃i
H1, . . . , Hn ` ∃x. P (x)
– The ∃ elimination rule is more complicated. It says that if
assuming P (x) and nothing more about x, we derive C, which
does not depend on x, and if we have a proof of ∃x. P (x), we can
conclude C without the hypothesis P (x):
H ′1, . . . , H
′
p ` ∃x. P (x)
no free occurrence of x
in any term of any Hi
nor in any term of C
P (x), H1, . . . , Hn ` C
∃e
H ′1, . . . , H
′
p, H1, . . . , Hn ` C
6. The addition of terms to first order logic does not change the expressive power,
since terms can be defined from predicates: a function f is a binary predicate F (_,_)
such that ∀x∃yF (x, y) and ∀x∀y∀z(F (x, v)&F (x, z)⇒ y = z).
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this rule could also be expressed by a rule stating that from the hypothesis
∃x.P (x) it is possible to conclude P (x), where x does not occur in the other
hypotheses and does not occur in the conclusion of the proof.
2.6 Individual concepts and second order
An alternative way to deal with quantification is to use individual concepts,
i.e., properties that hold for exactly one individual. This is the reason why
in the Discourse Representation Theory some people write John(x) while
others write j: the former notation describes an individual concept John(_)
which says that the property of being John is true for exactly one individual.
This can be formulated in second and first order logic: X is an individual
concept whenever C(X) = (∀x∀y(X(x) ∧ X(y) ⇒ x = y)) ∧ ∃x. X(x)
holds—there are variants in which the existence is not required. Universal
quantification can be phrased with individual concepts via second order
quantification. Indeed, ∀x. P (x) can be expressed as ∀X(C(X) ⇒ P#(X))
with P#(X) = ∃x. (X(x)∧P (x)). Conversely, given a property Q of individual
concepts, the quantification ∀X. (C(X) ⇒ Q(X)) corresponds to ∀x. Qb(x)
with Qb(x) = ∃X. (C(X)∧X(x)∧Q(X)). The equivalences are established by
formal proof in second order logic using second order quantification, and by
duality the same result holds for existential quantification. There is a variant
according to which non emptiness is not required, since it is possible to name
individuals that do not exist. When this is the case, one form of quantification
is stronger than the other. One might wonder why one uses individual concepts
and therefore second order logic. One reason is that individual concepts are
closer to the notion of term in Ancient and Medieval logic: both Socrates
and human beings are terms. A more concrete reason is that, in possible
worlds semantics with rigid designators (the standard interpretation in formal
semantics), it is impossible to interpret I do not believe that Tully is Cicero
[Lacroix 2011].
2.7 Proof and refutation semantics
Proof theoretical approaches naturally lead to rules of refutation. How does
one refute a universal statement ∀xP (x)? Of course, this amounts to proving
its negation, the existential statement ∃x¬P (x), but there are different ways
to do so. Consider the following example:
(42) [The AKC notes] that any dog may bite.
(43) No, Rex would never bite.(us)
(44) Basset hounds do not bite.(us)
The difference is that the first answer picks up an element in the relevant
model, while the second answer remains with generic elements. This is related
196 Michele Abrusci, Fabio Pasquali & Christian Retoré
to the Avicenian idea that a property of a term (individual or not) is always
asserted for the term as part of a class: the view of Avicenna is more related
to type theory than to the Fregean view of a single universe.
3 Hilbert’s operators
Russell introduced the operator7 ι for definite descriptions, meaning the one
and unique individual such that P .
Hilbert used generic elements intensively for quantification (with
Ackerman and Bernays). This study was initiated by Hilbert in [Hilbert 1922]
and it culminated in the second volume of Grundlagen der Mathematik with
Bernays [Hilbert & Bernays 1939]. It should be stressed that the presenta-
tion of these operators by Hilbert relied on natural language examples—an
uncommon feature in Hilbert’s writings. Hilbert’s ε operator has recently led
to important work in linguistics, in particular with von Heusinger’s work [Egli
& Heusinger 1995], [Heusinger 1997, 2004].
3.1 An ancestor to Hilbert operators:
Russell’s operator for definite descriptions
The first step, due to Russell, was to denote by ιx. F (x) the unique individual
enjoying the property F in a definite description, as in the first example in the
list below and in Principia Mathematica. When existence or unicity fails, it
is said that the reference of ιx. F (x) is the null class. A predicate applied to
such a non existing individual should be false. This results in a complicated
distinction between primary and secondary occurrences of a definite noun
phrase to avoid that the two first sentences, which are the negation one of
another, are both false [Russell 1905].
(45) The present king of France is bald.
(46) The present king of France is not bald.
(47) The present president of France was born in Rouen.(us)
(existence and uniqueness hold)
(48) The present king of France was born in Pau.(us)
(existence fails)
(49) The minister was born in Le Mans.(us)
(uniqueness fails)
7. Curry suggested in [Curry & Feys 1958, 275] to call a subnector an operator
applying to a formula with a free variable, binding this free variable and yielding an
individual term. The term is precise and well chosen but we shall not use it, because
only a few people do.
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3.2 Hilbert’s operator ε-operator and τ-operator
Hilbert introduced for each formula an ε-term, i.e., an existential term contain-
ing the ε-operator: given a formula F (x), with a free variable x, one defines the
term εx. F , where all the occurrences of x in F are bound (this is the original
notation, nowadays this term is often written as εx. F (x)). The ε-axiom states
that whenever an element, say a, enjoys F , then the ε-term εx. F enjoys F .
Dually, Hilbert introduced for each formula F a τ -term τx. F (x), i.e., a
universal term containing the τ -operator, which corresponds to the generic
elements used in mathematical proofs. The τ -axiom states that if τx. F (x)
enjoys the property F then every individual does.
By the ε-axiom, εx.¬F (x) plays the role of τx. F (x); conversely by
τ -axiom, τx. ¬F (x) plays the role of εx. F (x).
The evident deduction rules for τ and ε are as follows:
• Introduction rule for ε-terms: from A(c) infer A(εx. A(x)).
• Elimination rule for ε-terms: from A(εx. A(x)) infer A(x), where no free
occurrences of x are in the context of the proof.
• Introduction rule for τ -terms: from A(x) infer A(τx. A(x)), provided
that no free occurrences of x are in the context of the proof.
• Elimination rule for τ -terms: from A(τx. A(x)) infer A(c).
These rules show that F (τx. F (x)) ≡ ∀x. F (x) and F (εx. F (x)) ≡ ∃x. F (x).
Thus existential and universal quantifiers may be defined by means of Hilbert’s
operators and, by duality, one of these is redundant. We keep, as it is
customary, the ε-operator and thus the logic with epsilon operator is known
as the epsilon calculus.
Hilbert turned these symbols into an attractive mathematical object, since
it allows to fully describe quantification with simple rules. The first and second
epsilon theorem basically say that the epsilon calculus is at least as expressive
as first order logic.
First ε-theorem When inferring a formula C with neither ε-symbol nor
quantifier from formulas Γ not involving the ε-symbol nor quantifiers
the derivation can be done within quantifier free predicate calculus.
Second ε-theorem When inferring a formula C without ε-symbol from
formulae Γ not involving the ε-symbol the derivation can be done within
predicate calculus.
3.3 Expressive power of Hilbert’s epsilon
Indeed the epsilon calculus is more expressive than first order logic, since
in the former there are formulas which are not equivalent to any first order
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formula, e.g., formulas of the form P (εx. F (x)), where P and F are two
nonequivalent formulas. Nevertheless, it is remarkable to note that every
formula of the form P (εx. F (x)) “stands between” two first order formulas,
such as in the following:
∃x F (x) ∧ ∀y (F (y)⇒ P (y)) ` P (εx. F (x)) and P (εx. F (x)) ` ∃x P (x).
The first and second epsilon theorem provided the first correct proof
of Herbrand’s theorem (long before mistakes where found and solved by
Goldfarb) and a proof of the consistency of first order Peano arithmetic
(contemporary to Gentzen’s proof). The extension of the cut elimination
patterns to these operators does not seem too complicated and this work as
already been undertaken by [Mints 2008].
3.4 Individual concept and Hilbert’s epsilon
Recall that in first order logic an individual concept is a formula P such that
the two following formulas hold:
∀x ∀y ((P (x) ∧ P (y))→ x = y) and ∃x P (x).
A straightforward example of an individual concept is provided by a formula
of the form x = t where t is a term.
Using the same definition in Hilbert’s epsilon calculus, we can show
that there are no individual concepts other than equalities, i.e., if P is an
individual concept, then
P (x) a` x = εx. P (x)
In fact, if P is an individual concept
P (x)
∃x P (x)
P (εx. P (x))
P (x) ∧ P (εx. P (x))
x = εx. P (x)
x = εx. P (x)
∃x P (x)
P (εx. P (x))
x = εx. P (x) ∧ P (εx. P (x))
P (x)
3.5 Hilbert’s operators in natural language
In Hilbert’s book, these operators are explained with natural language exam-
ples, but a very important linguistic property is not stated. The εx. F (x)
has a type (both in the intuitive and in the formal sense) of a noun phrase,
and is meant to be the argument of a predicate (for instance the subject of a
verb), thus being a suppositio in the medieval sense [de Libera 1996], [Kneale
& Kneale 1986].
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Nowadays, we witness a renewed interest in these epsilon formulations
of quantification, in particular by von Heusinger [Heusinger 1997, 2004]. He
actually uses two variants of the epsilon, one εa corresponding to the indefinite
article “a” and the other one εd corresponding to definite determiners like
“the” or “this”. When interpreting an indefinite noun phrase like “a man”, the
corresponding term εax.man(x) is to be interpreted as a “new” man. When
interpreting a definite noun phrase like “the man” the corresponding term
εdx.man(x), where uniqueness constraints are left out, is to be interpreted as
the most salient man in the possible discourse referents, leaving out the unique-
ness of the iota operator of Russell. It is not clear whether the equivalence
with ordinary existential quantification is retained. Von Heusinger constructs
an epsilon term whenever there is an expression like a man or the man, but
it is not clear how one can assert that man(εx. man(x)). Another difficulty
is that different occurrences of the very same logical term εax.man(x) ought
to have different interpretations—and the various occurrences of εdx.man(x)
may have different interpretation as well.8
4 Generalised quantifiers
The abundant literature on generalised quantifiers follows and enriches Frege’s
view with model theory. Initiated with [Mostowski 1957], from [Lindström
1966] it is assumed that generalized quantifiers like thirty per cent or many or
most are functions of two predicates viewed as sets and this view was success-
fully developed in [Barwise & Cooper 1981] for natural language semantics.
Functions of two predicates are required, since the aforementioned Fregean
way to handle restricted quantification in a one-sorted logic (∀x ∈M P (x) ≡
∀x (M(x) ⇒ P (x))) does not apply. Indeed, as an easy exercise shows, the
two sentences below are not equivalent:
(50) Most students go out on Thursday nights.
(51) For most individuals, if they are students then they go out on Thursday
nights.
Generalised quantifiers, viewed as functions of two predicates or subsets of
the domain, are classified according to their behaviour with respect to their two
arguments: covariant, contravariant, and properties with respect to existential
quantification (weakness). Some rules are provided, but in fine they amount
8. The notation of von Heusinger may be misleading. He uses η for an existential
term to be interpreted by a new element, commonly introduced by “a”. He uses ε
for interpreting the definite article, from which he leaves out the unicity condition,
and this term is interpreted as the most salient element. In Hilbert one also finds a η
operator: the difference with Hilbert’s ε-term is that η terms can only be introduced
in the language when the existence is certain. Hilbert does not worry about the model
theoretic interpretation of these terms [Hilbert & Bernays 1939].
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to count how many elements are in the class corresponding to the restriction,
in the main predicate itself and in their intersections. This approach leaves
out sets that are infinite or potentially infinite. The proof rules that are given
always refer to an intended model, and therefore they cannot be considered
proof rules in the ordinary sense.
This sometimes leads to inaccurate results. For instance, most is defined
as the majority of although their actual usage is quite different: considering
the two following sentences, one can assert the first one but not the second
one:
(52) The majority of French electors voted Hollande in 2012.
(53) Most French electors voted Hollande in 2012.
Indeed, most is a vague quantifier and, as many, its validity depends on a
flexible and context dependent percentage. The fact that the usual cardinality
approach, the usual one, is wrong is proved by the following examples:
(54) a. Most numbers are not prime.
b. numbers and prime numbers have the same cardinality: ℵ0.
(55) a. Most people want to have children.
b. which set does “people” refer to? is it a finite set?
Indeed, what is clear is that a measure is required, but counting is not the
only way to measure a set. For instance, as far as cardinality is concerned, the
first sentence would be false, although we agree with this statement from the
introduction of an advanced book on number theory.9
Another problematic point is to consider generalised quantifiers as func-
tions of several predicates (following [Lindström 1966]), while mathematical
quantifiers are functions of a single predicate: given a predicate P (x) one can
form ∀x. P (x). General quantifiers depend on several predicates, which usually
are the main predicate and the restriction to a given class. The quantifier
Q (some, all, most,...) in a sentence like Q children sleep is supposed, in
the standard view to be a function that applies to the predicate children
(restriction class) and to the main predicate sleep. Hence Q children cannot
be interpreted in this standard view which goes against the syntactic and
cognitive structure of language. Indeed, if a speaker starts a sentence with Q
children before coming to the verb, the hearer already has in mind an image of
what Q children is, only by the presence of the word children—“a child, many
children, all children, two children,...” should be viewed as generic individuals
or as subsets of the set of children and that’s not the way they are interpreted
in the standard interpretation with generalised quantifiers.
Drawbacks of the standard approach is avoided when using (generalised)
Hilbert operators or choice functions for interpreting determiners [Retoré 2013,
9. We agree because the percentage of primes among the n first integers decreases
and its limit is 0.
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2014b]. This can be viewed as a formal development of Geach’s ideas on terms
and predicates [Geach 1962]. This approach with individual terms can be
extended to generalised quantifiers like “most” as done in [Retoré 2012].
5 Towards rules for some generalised
quantifiers
Keeping the idea of individual terms that express quantification, we started
to study generalised quantification from two converging viewpoints. One
viewpoint is the interface between syntax and semantics, i.e., how do we map
the syntactic structure of a sentence to a logical formula that represents the
semantics of that sentence. The other viewpoint is the proof theory of terms
and formulas expressing generalised quantification: how do we prove and refute
them?
5.1 Semantic representations with generalised
quantifiers
Regarding the first viewpoint, we advocate a typed version of Hilbert’s generic
elements, as in [Retoré 2012]. Consider the following sentences:
(56) Most dogs bite.
(57) Most of the students that passed algebra passed logic.
In those sentences, the first restriction class, namely dogs, can be viewed as
a type, while in the second example the restriction class students that passed
algebra is a formula with a unique free variable. Those operators are constants
of second order lambda calculus (system F), which is the typed lambda calculus
that we use as a framework for natural language semantics [Retoré 2014a]. We
actually have two distinct versions of the operator introducing a most generic
element. A first one maps a type to an element in the type itself so its type is
ΠX.X. The second one applies to a term, a predicate P over some type U , i.e.,
P is of type T → prop (here T =student) as argument and yields an element x
of this type U (here student) with additionally the presupposition that this
x enjoys the property P (here the added presupposition is that the generic
student has passed algebra). Hence the type of the type of the second most is
ΠX.(X → prop) → X: it first applies to a type U (here: students) and then
to a predicate over U objects (passed algebra).10
We propose to do so for all generalised quantifiers, that is, to have generic
elements corresponding to them, defined as typed Hilbert’s operators. This
10. There are no closed terms of type ΠX.X nor of type ΠX.(X → prop) → X,
because these formulae cannot be proved, but adding constants with these types is
safe.
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is a way to compute their semantic representations, but it does not say how
they are interpreted (we only provided some hints), neither how one asserts
and refutes sentences with such quantifiers [Retoré 2014b].
5.2 Proof theoretical meaning of generalized
quantification
Concerning the the majority of quantifier, we thought about what could be
the rules for proofs (introduction rules) and refutations (elimination rules) for
such a quantifier. There are at least two ways to refute that the majority of
the A have the property P (where for the majority of we mean strictly more
than 50%) :
• Only the minority of the A has the property P .
• There is another property Q which holds for the majority of the A, with
no A satisfying both P and Q.
One way to add a generalised quantifier to a proof system is to introduce
a pair of dual quantifiers, a variant ∀∗ of ∀ and a variant ∃∗ of ∃.
If they can be compared, one has to choose one of the following two
possibilities, the first one being unlikely:
• ∀∗x. A(x) implies ∀x. A(x) and so ∃x. A(x) implies ∃∗x. A(x).
• ∃∗x. A(x) implies ∃x. A(x) and so ∀x. A(x) implies ∀∗x. A(x).
In both the cases, one of the two new quantifiers is obtained by extending an
existing rule, and the other one by restricting an existing rule. Although
a complete set of rules is not available, it is likely that a family of rules
and refutation techniques that would model a large part of those quantifiers’
behaviour can be found.
One can also say that the new quantifier(s) cannot be compared with the
standard ones. For instance there is no reason to compare two variants of the
universal quantifier, one say ∀τ , expressing the rule that every individual (or
the generic individual with respect to P ) has property P (such rules admit
exceptions but apply to any situation) and the other say, ∀&, expressing
the fact that by coincidence each individual has property P , and this is
a conjunction over all the elements in the domain (no exception but such
statements are context dependent)—hence the domain must be known for
∀&. The introduction rule for generic quantification should be the usual
introduction rule: from A(x) with no assumption on x infer ∀τxP (x). The
introduction rule for quantification as conjunction should look like Gentzen’s
ω-rule for arithmetic [Gentzen 1936]: from P (x) for any x in the domain,
infer ∀&xP (x). The elimination rule of ∀&xP (x) should be as expected: one
can recover P (x) for any x in the domain. The elimination rule for the ∀τ is
complicated since you can infer P (x) only for those x that are not exceptions,
and handling exceptions would require a substantial extension of the logical
framework.
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6 Conclusion
After some criticisms of the common set theoretic approach, we gave some
hints for a proof theoretical approach to quantification. One idea is to use
typed versions of Hilbert operator for computing the semantic representations
and we are presently doing so in a type theoretical framework [Retoré 2014a].
Another idea that we are exploring is to use principles on proofs and cut-
elimination/normalisation to design the rules of generalised quantifiers, and
this can also be discussed in our typed theoretical framework.
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